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1: Introduction 
 
As the ISAF military involvement in Afghanistan approaches its conclusion, uncertainty abounds as to the 
future of the country after the troops pull out. In spite of a decade-long mission intended to support the 
Afghan government in reducing the capability of insurgents (identified as the Taliban), bolster the Afghan 
National Security Forces and assist in improving governance and socio-economic development to create 
stability in the country, there is clear evidence that the mission has failed to achieve its objectives in doing 
so. Officials involved in the mission are loath to admit failure in the mission, but as the deadline for the 
pullout approaches, except for the occasional localized success story, the country seems to be stuck in a 
quagmire of violence, corruption and instability reminiscent of conditions immediately after the Soviets 
pulled out in 1989. 
 
The objective of this project is to identify (rational arguments in favor notwithstanding) whether the actual 
conditions required for a negotiated settlement exist. In our research, we have found a theoretical 
perspective that can assist in creating a framework for analysis though with some adjustments made to 
adapt it to the purpose of our project. With the framework, we will see if the criteria for a negotiated 
settlement can be met. We will look at the empirical data through the descriptive/ analytical Contingency 
Framework put forth by Sawyer & Guetzkow (1965) and further elaborated by Druckman (1973). Taking 
this as a starting point we focus our attention on 5 specific points and ultimately hold it up against the 
findings of a large-scale study conducted by Jackson (2000) to test the likelihood of a negotiated 
settlement in the current Afghan conflict. Firstly, we will look at who the actors in an eventual negotiation 
will be and what their interests and desired outcomes are. Secondly, we will look at how they are likely to 
act in a negotiation structure. Thirdly, their respective power relations. Fourth, we look at the possible 
timing and environment of the actual negotiations to be held to achieve a settlement. Lastly, given our 
previous conclusions we will look at the various dimensions of outcomes to see if there exists a possibility 
for negotiations achieving a result acceptable to all involved parties. 
 
A dialogue in Afghanistan will not only consist of two participants, ISAF and Taliban. We need to take into 
consideration that Afghanistan has a government of its own, which ISAF is helping to rebuild the country. 
The Taliban in Pakistan, including other agencies could also be viable members who would have 
something to say in the peacemaking process. As goes for UN, that in the first place gave ISAF a mandate 
to take military action in Afghanistan. Various NGO´s could also see fit to join the dialogue, to make sure 
that Taliban abides by the laws regarding women and human rights in particular. The Taliban in 
Afghanistan has relations with the Afghan government; the president from Afghanistan said in his first 
speech that he would go into dialogue with them. 
 
ISAF was deployed in Afghanistan to secure Kabul, and help re-establish the government and socio-
economic development. Over the course of a couple of years they got the responsibility for the security 
in the whole country, and as of now they have around 34.000 stationed soldiers from 48 different 
countries, of which 24.000 are from the US. As of now ISAF was supposed to exit Afghanistan in the end 
of 2014, but this deadline has been extended for a short duration. After 2014 their role will evolve into 
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training, advising and assisting the Afghanistan government and army (NATO ACN, 2013). Even though 
ISAF exists of a collaboration of a lot of different countries, the major players behind ISAF is the US and 
NATO. US because above 50 % of the armed forces is from America and NATO because ISAF is a section 
under NATO. Furthermore in the report “The commander allied joint force command Brunssum visits 
ISAF” he states that they will gradually start to pull out troops when the Afghan army has reached their 
agreed number of 352.000 troops. 
 
To shortly illustrate the position of the Taliban in terms of negotiation, we will draw on this quote from a 
news article: “In September, one of the Taliban's negotiators in Qatar said publicly that their goal was not 
to revive the former Taliban administration but to form an Islamic government participated in by all 
people, reflecting the aspirations of all Afghan people, of all ethnic groups." (Waldman, M., 2012). As the 
quote states, Taliban’s goal is not to go back to the former Taliban Administration, but they want to make 
a new government, where everybody is participating, and all ethnic groups between. 
 
Another significant factor is the US position towards the Taliban. Another article covers this issue and 
states: “For years, the United States rejected talks with the Taliban in the belief that it could defeat them. 
Unable to outfight or outlast the insurgents, it now favors a political solution. The problem with that, 
however, is that at this stage of the conflict, enmity and mistrust between the parties is ingrained, U.S. 
influence is diminishing, and the Taliban are gaining ground.” (Keating, M. & Waldman, M., 2013). 
A clear description and reminder that the conflict indeed is complex, especially in relation the Taliban’s 
position and significance in the conflict. 
 
As the end game draws nearer, a significant change has taken place in regards to the attitude towards the 
ousted Taliban. Whereas initially the Taliban were seen as the primary enemy from whom the Afghan 
population needed to be liberated, their involvement in the end game is increasingly being seen as 
essential. Matt Waldman (Waldman, M., 2010) argues that negotiations with the Taliban are not only 
essential, but that now is the most favorable time to meet them at the negotiating table. While his 
arguments certainly are compelling, with sound logic and reasoning. Indeed we do not disagree that 
negotiations seem to make the most sense given the on ground realities in Afghanistan. 
 
We do however draw a distinction between the soundness of the arguments in theory and in practice. 
Rationale alone is not sufficient for negotiations to take place and achieve some measure of success in 
leaving behind a stable country. It is also imperative that the conditions exist for success. As the argument 
for negotiation has gained greater traction on either side of the divide over recent years, any practical 
attempts to execute meaningful negotiations have so far been fruitless. How is it possible that the 
conflicting parties seem agreeable to negotiations, yet bear no fruit when attempted? 
 
We believe that much of the debate on the matter takes place within a Rational Choice perspective, 
looking at the parties involved in the conflict as unitary actors working to maximize benefit. We also 
believe that while this allows us to reach conclusions on the rationality of negotiations, it fails to address 
some of the very real obstacles to engaging in negotiation and achieving any measure of success. 
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The structure of the project consists of three parts. The first part of this project will outline the five tier 
theoretical framework and the rationales for their application, the methodology we employ in obtaining 
the data as well as how we apply the data to said theoretical framework. The second part is focused on 
creating the historical, political and social context within which this conflict is taking place.  In trying to 
determine whether negotiation is possible, one must be wary of focusing too much on one side of the 
conflict. Indeed this is a problem often encountered in western-centric academia, where the tenets of 
modernity tend to go unquestioned and the onus being on what may be done to bring the less fortunate 
up to speed. In the third part, we apply the data to draw conclusions and identify the obstacles that stand 
in the way of a peaceful settlement through negotiations. 
 
In the next section, we will present our research question, working questions, theoretical framework and 
methodology. By answering our research questions we hope to achieve, an extensive comprehension of 
negotiation with the Taliban is so hard and how their desired goals can be defined and perhaps applied, 
in a negotiation process. In the debate at the panel at Chatham House, Matt Waldman argues that 
reconciliation with the Taliban is possible; however it will be difficult and take a considerable amount of 
time (Chatham House, 2013). Our theory section will explain our approach to theorizing the possibilities 
of negotiations and finally explaining the methodology we will apply. 
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2: Research question, theory & methodology 
2.1 Research Question: 
 
Do the conditions exist for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban to ensure stability in 
Afghanistan, in the wake of the impending ISAF pullout? 
 
2.2 Working questions: 
 
Theory 
● What are the theoretical perspectives of dialogue and negotiations as conflict resolution among 
political actors? 
 
Context 
● What is the history of Afghanistan and how is the current political scenario/situation in Afghanistan? 
 
● What is the historical context and status of the ISAF exit strategy? 
 
● How did the Taliban and ISAF emerge, and how has the ISAF mission and the discourse on 
negotiations with the Taliban developed over time?  
 
Analysis 
● How do the various parties/stakeholders fit into the theoretical framework for negotiation and 
dialogue and why? 
 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework: 
 
2.3.1 Introduction to the theory 
 
In attempting to answer our research question we immediately faced the challenge of identifying a theory 
to form the backbone of our analysis. Ultimately we developed our own theoretical perspective guided in 
no little part by the Contingency Framework developed by Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) and further 
elaborated by Druckman (1973). The Contingency Framework has been used in a variety of ways in conflict 
resolution academia, from analyzing individual cases to large scale analyses of conflicts spanning several 
decades (Jackson, 2000). The framework specifies three distinct time dimensions in which conflict 
management takes place, the antecedent, concurrent and consequent. The antecedent refers to the 
conditions that lead up to the act of resolving a conflict. The concurrent focuses on the conditions that 
characterize the actual process. The consequent gives attention to the outcome of the process. 
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For the purpose of this project we have simplified the framework to adjust for the space limitation and 
decided to focus on 5 specific areas which will address the antecedent, concurrent and consequent 
variables. 
 
In this case, the antecedent variables provide the context in which an eventual negotiation between the 
concerned parties will take place. The antecedent variables as identified by the Contingency Framework 
includes firstly the nature and intensity of the dispute, the issues of contention and the complexity. The 
nature, intensity and issues speak to the ”what’s” and “how’s” of the dispute and the extent to which the 
conflict has escalated. The complexity speaks more to the number and level of involvement of the various 
participants in the conflict. While the nature, intensity and contended issues are well-documented and 
researched in terms of the afghan conflict, our initial research indicated that the complexity of the conflict 
is grossly understated. Some attempts have been made to map the various parties with a significant 
interest in the eventual resolution of the Afghan Conflict (Waldman, M., 2014), however the narrative in 
favor of negotiation continues to view the conflict as a bilateral issue between rational parties. For this 
reason the first aspect we will look into is who the actors in an eventual negotiation will be, their interests 
and their desired outcomes. 
 
The antecedent variables in the Contingency Framework also include the nature of the parties involved in 
the conflict in terms of their relative power, the alignment and previous relations. Over the duration of 
the conflict, perspectives on the relative power of the involved parties have changed significantly. Where 
the military supremacy of the US-led invasion forces initially heralded their absolute power in Afghanistan, 
the subsequent elusiveness of final victory, and increasing pressure to pull out from Afghanistan without 
having achieved the central mission objective indicates that the power relationship is not and has never 
been as one-sided as initially assumed. Our abridged theoretical framework therefore will go into 
analyzing the “nature” of the parties firstly in terms of their internal decision-making process and secondly 
the relative power relationship of the involved parties. 
 
The concurrent variables refer to the process of negotiation meaning the timing, manner and environment 
of the negotiations. The Contingency Framework attaches importance to the timing of the negotiation 
and a study has shown (Jackson, 2000) that the likelihood of a negotiated settlement rises and falls 
according to when in the duration of a conflict negotiations are attempted. Likewise the environment in 
which the negotiations take place, may give an indication as to the success of the negotiations as it gives 
a good indication of the level of trust and the desire for a negotiated settlement in the involved parties. 
The framework also considers the initiator of negotiations and the identity of the individuals conducting 
the negotiation as important variables, however given the fact that in spite of several abortive attempts 
at negotiation none have been initiated nor have actual negotiators been identified, we will not delve into 
these variables in our analysis. Some assumptions can however be made regarding the timing and 
environment of negotiations in light of the announced plans of military pull-out as well as the offers from 
“third” parties to host any eventual negotiations as already seen in the short-lived establishment of a 
Taliban office in Qatar. 
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The consequent or outcome variables focus on the conditions under which the results of a negotiated 
settlement may be accepted. Even though the results of a successful negotiation cannot be anticipated 
fully, based on our analysis and available data it is possible to make certain qualified assumptions 
regarding the spectrum of acceptable settlements for all parties. We analyze the outcome variables in 
light of 5 dimensions of outcomes outlined by Arild Underdal (2002) to try and gain a deeper 
understanding of the dependent variables. We look at whether negotiations can result in a formal 
agreement, its effectiveness, stability, the distribution of costs and benefits and the parties’ distance from 
their opening positions. 
 
For each area of our analysis we have drawn upon specific theories and studies in order delve into the 
matter as deeply as possible. The objective is to identify specific characteristics of an eventual negotiation 
in order to finally evaluate whether the conditions exist to merit any hope of success for eventual 
negotiations. The framework consists of separate theoretical approaches used to evaluate each of the 5 
areas we have identified. This framework will allow us to evaluate each of 5 aspects on its own to thereby 
determine if the criterion for successful negotiations can be met. 
 
The five areas we will be looking at are: 
1. The Actors 
2. Their internal dynamics of decision-making 
3. Their power relations 
4. Timing and environment of negotiations 
5. Dimensions of Outcomes 
 
Each area defines the nature of possible negotiations, outlining the criteria for successful negotiations and 
allows us to insert known data into a structure whereby we can determine if the negotiations can bear 
fruit. 
 
2.3.2 The Actors: 
 
First, we will be identifying the various actors in a possible negotiation. In a fragmented society and 
volatile region as Afghanistan and its environs, identifying the various actors or groups of actors that can 
be considered stakeholders in an eventual negotiation process is more complex than the simplistic ISAF 
vs Taliban, Insurgents vs Counter-insurgency dichotomy implied by media reports. While there can be 
little doubt that the situation in Afghanistan has numerous stakeholders, we need to determine whether 
eventual negotiations will be bilateral or multilateral. Will the various stakeholders be able to unite in 
more or less cohesive blocks for bilateral negotiations or will they come to the table (if at all) as separate 
entities with individual agendas. Bilateral negotiations usually have an easier time reaching an agreement, 
but conversely have less chances of the agreement surviving than a multilateral and admittedly more 
complex agreement as identified by Rubin (2002). This will have a fundamental influence on whether 
possible negotiations have a realistic chance of achieving success. In the case of the Afghan conflict, 
merely terming the negotiations bilateral and restricting the number of parties involved in the process 
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may yield an agreement, but if any party with a capability of disrupting the reached agreement are 
deliberately excluded from the process the longevity of the agreement is seriously threatened (ibid). 
 
Multilateral negotiations are by their very nature a different beast in comparison to bilateral negotiations. 
On account of the complexity of arriving at a settlement acceptable to multiple parties, some order must 
be sought in the chaos of demands, expectations and stances of all involved. Several solutions have been 
put forth by leading academics in how to approach multilateral complexity.  
 
2.3.3 The Internal Dynamics of Decision-Making 
 
During the course of the current Afghan conflict, the various involved parties have expressed mission 
objectives that range from the logical to the irrational. If they are all to be viewed from a rational choice 
perspective, one may be tempted to assume the parties to be mentally unsound. This is however hardly 
likely to be the case. We must therefore look a bit deeper into the process whereby the various parties 
arrive at these positions 
 
Using Allisons (1971) categorization of three types of actors in international relations, we will see how 
they apply to the identified actors. This will give us a view of the incentives driving the identification of 
desired outcomes as well as the characteristics of each party as actors in the negotiation. 
We will determine with available data whether the identified parties will identify their desired outcomes 
and stance in negotiation through Rational Choice Policy, Organizational Structure or Bureaucratic Politics. 
Each model presupposes a specific pattern of action and reaction and predetermines the spectrum of 
available solutions. No matter how integrative the negotiation, the fundamental nature of the actors may 
make it impossible for them to agree on certain points, as well as show flexibility in their own demands. 
Likewise, it may cause them to assume untenable stances on contentious issues allowing for no chance of 
resolution. 
 
Rational Choice Policy considers the Nation as an inherently value-maximizing actor, making choices based 
on what course of action will rank highest in terms of its objectives and goals. This is the predominant 
view of international politics among academics and laypeople alike. It views actions taken by actors as the 
result of deliberate choices based on a rational analysis of available options in light of clearly identified 
goals. It is this perspective which has dominated the discourse on negotiations in Afghanistan, considering 
the various actors to be engaging in value-maximizing behavior in terms of their various strategies and 
tactics in the conflict. 
 
Organizational Process considers the decisions of actors to be less a matter of deliberation on achieving 
the set objectives and more the result of “output of large organizations functioning according to standard 
patterns of behavior” (Allison 1969). In order to manage the full spectrum of tasks required by a state, 
responsibility is divided among the state’s internal organizations which each work according to the 
standard operating procedures developed to manage the required work. The nature of these standard 
operating procedures and programs result in certain tendencies and a limited set of responses to 
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circumstances. An actor whose internal decision-making process follows this conceptual model is likely to 
have very real limitations to what it can countenance in a negotiation situation. 
 
Bureaucratic Politics looks at bargaining along established channels in a defined hierarchy. This conceptual 
model includes a competitive element in which it is not rational choice or output of organizations that set 
policy (in the context of this project, negotiating stance) but rather as outcomes of bargaining between 
the different players within the hierarchy. The decision making process is therefore not only influenced 
by external factors but by internal problems and issues as viewed by numerous players. Since the decision-
making process thus must contend with both external and internal variables, and since the individuals in 
key positions play such a significant part in determining the outcome, this model implies its own 
limitations. A decision required to resolve the external issues may not be possible to arrive at as a result 
of internal circumstances. 
 
2.3.4 Power Relations 
 
No negotiation can be analyzed without considering the relative power of each actor. A structural analysis 
as defined by Zartman (2002) will allow us to determine whether the negotiation falls under a symmetrical 
or asymmetrical power model. Each model implies certain basic realities guiding the outcome and 
possibility of success for the negotiation. It is also imperative that the actors in the negotiation have a 
similar understanding of the power relation or whether one or the other has an unrealistic view of the 
reality of the situation. 
 
An exhaustive analysis of power relations would necessarily have to begin with a clear definition of what 
“power” is and its implication. This debate however lies beyond the scope of this project, for which reason 
we simply define power as “ the ability of A to influence changes in B”. We realize that this is a very broad 
definition, however we consider it sufficient for the purposes of our analysis. 
 
In symmetrical power relations the core idea revolves around the fact that in a negotiation, each party 
has the power of veto meaning that they have the power to end negotiations by leaving the table. This 
situation implies a power equality between the parties which in turn has been identified as the best 
condition for satisfactory negotiations (Rubin and Brown, 1975 in Kremenyuk p 75). This, however, also 
results in a stalemate which in turn creates a situation where negotiations cannot progress until both sides 
acknowledge the stalemate. The parties seek to disprove the equality by means other than negotiation, 
essentially trying to find a position of strength prior to engaging in negotiations.  On the other hand, even 
though the equality obstructs a “first move” by any of the parties, it also fosters greater reciprocity and a 
tit-for-tat on concessions which then becomes the norm for the negotiation (Bartos, 1978 in Kremenyuk 
pp. 73). 
 
The asymmetrical model assumes a certain power differential between the negotiating parties. One party 
may need the negotiated settlement more than the other, one may have a greater capacity for disrupting 
an agreement, while one may even have the ability to willfully impose an agreement based on military 
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and economic supremacy. This model seems to lie closer to the reality of negotiations, acknowledging the 
power differential even in seemingly symmetrical cases (both parties have veto right, but one party has a 
greater need for the negotiated settlement for various reasons). Jackson’s (2002) large scale study 
suggests that while a massive power differential is not conducive to reaching a negotiated settlement 
acceptable to all parties, power equality also does not automatically imply greater success in negotiations. 
In fact, a certain degree in power differential seems to be the most conducive for reaching an acceptable 
negotiated settlement. 
 
There is no doubt that the nature of the power of each party in the afghan conflict differs. We will attempt 
to analyze their relative power and by looking at the level of symmetry and asymmetry try to evaluate its 
conduciveness to the achievement of an acceptable negotiated settlement. 
 
2.3.5 Timing and Environment of Negotiations 
 
The second cluster of variables in the Contingency Framework focuses on the actual circumstances of the 
negotiations themselves. These include the timing and environment of the negotiations as well as the 
initiator of the negotiations and the identity of the negotiators. We focus our analysis on the timing and 
the possible environment of the negotiations. We have chosen to exclude the initiator and identity of the 
negotiator as our analysis may only give us a very vague idea as to who may initiate the negotiations and 
we have no realistic way of deducing the identity of the possible negotiator. Which party initiates the 
negotiations and who will conduct the negotiations are factors subsequent to the timing and 
environment. The conduciveness to a negotiated settlement of the timing and environment therefore are 
the primary variables we need to evaluate in this section. 
The timing refers to the stage in the conflict at which negotiations are attempted. Opinion is divided on 
when in the duration of the conflict negotiations are most likely to bear fruit (Jackson 2000). One side 
holds that the conflict is best resolved at an early stage before it crosses the violence threshold when 
either side have inflicted and sustained such extensive damage that it is nigh impossible to end the dispute 
save through the victory of one and defeat of the other. Others argue that the chances are best at a later 
stage when the cost of war in lives and material has made the disputing parties more amenable to a 
negotiated settlement. Zartman (1985) argues that the disputing parties become “ripe” at a certain point 
in the conflict, after they have sustained some losses and before the dispute becomes entrenched. 
Jackson’s (2000) research corroborates this view, concluding that disputing parties are almost never likely 
to engage in negotiations early on in the conflict while they still believe in victory at all costs and that the 
chances of a negotiated settlement increases for a time until it again recedes on account of dispute having 
become entrenched. In the context of the Afghan Conflict we must evaluate if the “ripe” time for 
negotiations lies in the past, present or future. 
 
The environment for the negotiations refers to the physical and social space in which the negotiations 
occur. A neutral space for the negotiators without interference from the parties they represent or 
attention from the media creates a conducive environment for the negotiators to reach a settlement. 
Non-neutral spaces however may indicate undue advantage to one party and put the other party on the 
defensive. Jackson (2000) identifies three separate categories for the environment; one or the other 
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party’s territory, neutral sites and composite sites where  proposals are exchanged through letters or 
public announcements (also known as “arm’s length negotiations”) (ibid). Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, Jackson’s research found that negotiations in either party’s territory i.e. a non-neutral site tended 
to result in greater success in comparison to both neutral and composite sites. This may be linked to the 
level of trust implied by agreeing to meet in enemy territory, indicating a greater willingness to negotiate 
and greater confidence in negotiations as a means of resolving conflict. Negotiations in a neutral location 
are generally necessary when they are conducted with a feeling of mistrust and confrontation, which does 
not bode well for the chances of a negotiated settlement. Composite sites show the lowest level of success 
as it is the least conducive environment for negotiations as it is characterized both by physical and 
psychological distance between the negotiators with far greater chances of miscommunication and 
greater hostility towards each other and the negotiation process itself. What environment possible 
negotiations to resolve the afghan Conflict will take place in is not immediately clear. We will therefore 
seek to shed light on this to evaluate if the environment is likely to be conducive or not. 
 
2.3.6 Dimensions of outcomes 
 
The consequent cluster of variables focus on the outcomes of conflict resolution. These are the dependent 
variables and are viewed firstly in terms of success or failure and secondly in terms of durability. As we 
are not in a position to anticipate the results of a possible negotiation given that we are not using the 
Contingency Framework to input specific variable data, the simple success/failure dichotomy does not 
adequately address the full spectrum of possible outcomes. To this end we have expanded the framework 
using Arild Underdal’s (2002 in Kremenyuk) identification of 5 different dimensions of outcomes. We feel 
it is necessary to go into each of these areas to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
antecedent and concurrent variables we have analyzed. 
 
Arild Underdal identifies five dimensions of outcomes of negotiation. Given the previously identified 
characteristics of the negotiation and the actors as determined by the preceding 4 points, we will look at 
the range of outcomes in these five dimensions: 
 
● Agreement 
○ Can a formal agreement be formulated? The official purpose of negotiations is to establish 
mutual commitments. A central concern is whether the parties involved reached 
agreement. In negotiation literature the term can be understood both as a “meeting of 
minds” and a formal contract. The former carries no official commitment, whereas the 
latter formalizes them. However the former is a prerequisite for the latter. It is also 
important to note the comprehensiveness of the agreement. A ceasefire agreement is not 
as extensive as a permanent peace accord. We will be looking at whether an agreement 
in Afghanistan will be formalized and if so, how comprehensive is it likely to be. 
● Efficiency 
○ Will a possible agreement be efficient? Underdal (2002, in Kremenyuk) defines 
negotiation as “the making of collective decisions through agreements”. To arrive at the 
agreement required for collective decisions, at the minimum it requires integrative 
potential. This means increasing the benefits to all parties beyond the BATNA (Best 
14 
 
Alternative To Negotiated Agreement) (Fisher and Ury 1981). We must therefore evaluate 
whether a possible negotiated settlement will be preferable to the BATNA for the 
involved parties in Afghanistan in order to determine its likelihood of success. 
● Stability 
○ What level of stability can be expected from a negotiated agreement? A negotiated 
agreement can be said to be stable to the extent that the parties lack incentive to defect 
(overtly or covertly) or that the incentives are effectively curbed.  We will analyze whether 
a negotiated agreement in Afghanistan will require enforcement or whether it will 
achieve an equilibrium on account of its acceptability to all parties. 
● Distribution 
○ What will be the relative costs and benefits for either party? Underdal elucidates this 
aspect primarily in the context of economic negotiations. In the context of our project it 
is difficult to determine costs and benefits since the tradeoffs are political and social more 
than anything else. It is however still necessary to take a brief look at the price the 
involved parties will be willing to pay in terms of concessions on their demands to achieve 
a negotiated settlement. 
● Distance from opening position 
○ How far can either party move from their opening positions in order for them to still 
consider the negotiations a success? While negotiation practitioners occasionally 
describe outcomes in terms of distance from opening positions, Underdal considers this 
to be a questionable assumption. It is usually in media reports and public discussions that 
this view dominates, viewing the party seemingly furthest from its opening position as 
the loser in the negotiations. Regardless, however, of the validity of such assumptions, 
they can have a very real impact on negotiations, particularly when the negotiators are 
not professional negotiators. In terms of the afghan conflict it is thus important to venture 
some thoughts on how far the involved parties are able to move from their opening 
positions, and what those limitations imply. 
 
2.4 Methodology 
 
2.4.1 General outline 
 
This project aims to shed light on the factors involved and to be considered, within creation of a 
theoretical framework, based on existing negotiation and peace process theories, trying to explain which 
conditions and factors are crucial in the apparent challenge of preventing another civil war in Afghanistan, 
essentially testing the argument whether there is theoretical precedence for engaging in dialogue with 
the Taliban at all. We aim to design our own theoretical perspective in light of the Contingency 
Framework, which will be designed to determine whether conditions for negotiations exist. The elements 
of the framework we will establish are intended to test the veracity of specific arguments relevant to the 
conflict and actors. 
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The methodology of this project relies heavily on well-known theories of negotiation and peace process 
to explain whether a successful peaceful solution, with broad adherence and accept from the Afghan 
people and various actors within, has hope of being implemented in Afghanistan. 
 
Relying on key scholars with extensive insight on the topic, we will use perceptions and ideas of those to 
support our choices within creating a theoretical framework to explain possibilities of negotiation and 
which factors have theoretical impact on a peace process between key stakeholders in the country. 
 
We will use theory to explain points of contention between the parties involved as well as analyzing why 
certain expectations on either side or demands might prove as unrealistic or provide impossible 
theoretical means of resolution. 
 
The methodology essentially provides structure to the known factors in the Afghan Conflict in light of the 
Contingency Framework and tests the chances of a negotiated settlement by comparing it to the findings 
of Jackson’s (2000) study of 1154 attempts at negotiation in violent conflicts spanning a period from 1945 
to 1995. Using the statistical data compiled in this study we will be able to make certain qualified 
assumptions as to whether the conditions exist for a negotiated settlement or whether conditions vital to 
such a settlement are absent or unaddressed. 
 
2.4.2 The use of empirical sources 
 
Academic literature 
Well known published theories which can be applied to answer our research question will be derived from 
relevant academic literature. Also academic literature from specific scholars within the field, will provide 
great aid in understanding and explaining why and how key-factors in the conflict can and have to be 
taken into consideration. Using both peer reviewed data (published journals and books), as well as grey 
literature, specifically research papers, we expect this literature to provide meaningful insight to the 
conflict as a whole, support possible explanations in our findings after establishing a theoretical 
framework and placing relevant stakeholders within it, and perhaps to explain why our analysis turns out 
to be inconclusive. 
 
Primary data 
Our primary data will consist of three main parts. Firstly official reports from the UN, ISAF and other 
international stakeholders, including progress reports. Secondly books, will be used to establish an insight 
to the Taliban organization. Thirdly, various media sources, will also be a significant empirical source of 
primary data. We aim to subject these to content analysis in order to fit them into our theoretical 
framework. 
 
Official UN, ISAF reports etc., will provide useful insight to explain and describe the political positions, 
demands and expected outcomes of the ongoing military intervention and establishment of a functional 
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Afghan government throughout the application of international resources. Not only will it be useful within 
the application of theory to categorize and understand the purpose and basic structures of these 
organizations and create a historical perspective on how the organizations has developed over time - 
especially in terms of willingness to change, compromise and adapt. 
 
Media sources, primarily news articles, will help us provide insight on the conflict from an international 
perspective. This will provide useful in the process of understanding how some of theoretical factors apply 
to parties within the conflict, in light of the narratives.  
 
3: Historical and contemporary context of the conflict 
 
3.1 The history of Afghanistan 
 
 
Afghanistan 
Afghanistan is surrounded by four countries, it borders with Russia on the north, China on the Northeast, 
Iran on the west and Pakistan on the southeast.  None of these borders were established before 19th 
century. The “Great Game“, the conflict between Britain and Russia in Central Asia led to the creation of 
a buffer state. In 1838 during the 1st Anglo Afghan war, the British Empire launched their first major attack 
on Afghanistan. It was on that time Britain decided to study the area where, the Afghan “Pashtun tribe“ 
whom called themselves Phatan or Pashtun resided. The population of the Pashtun tribal was growing in 
Heart and Kandahar the land of Khurasan. The Pashtun tribal didn’t have any exact land, they counted 
themselves as a part of Khurasan. The British Empire gave the name of Afghanistan to Afghan / Pashtun 
tribal who lived in south of Hindu Kush. Afghanistan was born in its present boundaries during the Great 
Game. (Morten Tinning, 2011) 
   
The Great Game 
Throughout the centuries, Russia has slowly pushed their borders from the east across Siberia and from 
the south into the central Asia. Afghanistan was the most important country for the British Empire to 
occupy, to make sure they ruled central Asia. The British were scared that Afghanistan could become a 
route for Russia to invade British India or that the Afghan government might help the Indian people 
against the British. Both the Russian and British Empire fought over who should control Afghanistan. This 
competition between the two empires and the consequences it would have on Central Asia would   grow 
to a “Great Game” of wars that would continue into the first decade of 20th century (Thomas Taylor 
Hammond, 1984). 
  
The Anglo Afghan Wars 
The British military involvement in Afghanistan led to three Afghan Anglo wars between Britain and 
Afghanistan, which started in 1838. The British army was defeated in all three Anglo-Afghan wars by 
different Pashtun tribes. 
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In early 1839 Indian troops crossed from Sindh into Baluchistan with 6.000 men lead by Shash Shujah. The 
troops were divided in two parts, one part crossed the Bolan- Pass toward Kandahar and continued to 
Kabul, the other part came across Ghazni toward Kabul. Shah Shujah with his men entered Kabul on 7 
August 1839. Afghan forces defeated British Indian invaders. The conflict between Afghans and British 
troops continued and the British would suffer heavy losses (Morten Tinning, 2011).   
  
The conflict between the two countries continued until 30th of March 1855, the British signed a Friendship 
treaty in Peshawar and this situation remained until 1878.  On January 2, 1879, the second Anglo Afghan 
war began. The British troops once again attacked Afghanistan from three sides Kandahar, Khyber and 
Karam. The battle of Kandahar led to, Amir Abdulrahaman khans becoming the new Amir of Afghanistan. 
The British and Amir Abdulrahama khan signed another friendship treaty. The treaty contained that Britain 
would have the control of Afghanistan’s foreign policies for protection against the Russians and Persians 
(Morten Tinning, 2011). 
  
The 3rd Anglo Afghan war took place on 4th May 1919 this war is known as the war of independence. The 
3rd Anglo Afghan war continued for three months until 8th of August 1919 where another Peace Treaty 
between the two countries was signed in Rawalpindi of Pakistan. The Treaty contained that the British 
would give up control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs (Morten Tinning, 2011). 
  
The Durand Line 
Henry Mortimer Durand was a British diplomat, who played a major role in the British victory in India. 
Durand signed the Durand line treaty, which is a long border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1893. 
The Durand line was made for many purposes, in case of the Russian army wanting to occupy Afghanistan 
then they would have to approach from the Indian Ocean, which is in Baluchistan. This was a very 
important way to block the Russian army. After the funding of Pakistan in 1947 the Durand Line became 
the modern border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The border divided the Pashtun tribe in two each 
on one side of the Durand Line one side in Afghanistan and the other side in Pakistan. The treaty expired 
in 1993 and from that time until today, none of the governments in Afghanistan has recognized the 
Durand Line. 
  
Why the Durand Line matters 
Afghanistan has suffered extremely from Durand Line conflicts in the last decades. The problems with the 
Durand Line happened after the funding of Pakistan in 1947. As the border divided the Pashtuns in two 
sides, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Rahi, 2014). Pakistan got Military support from the US, the government 
in Afghanistan was afraid that the balance of power between Afghanistan and Pakistan had shifted in 
favor of Pakistan. Afghanistan needed a powerful and modern army to balance Pakistani power, so it 
turned to the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1978.  The Soviet Union supported Afghanistan 
economically and military. Thousands of Afghans went to military school in Moscow. The regime in 
Afghanistan had been Russian influenced and this led the Russians to invade Afghanistan in 1978 by the 
support of the Afghan communist government. 
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3.2 The history of Afghan politics - a brief overview 
 
A publication by the Canadian government (Parliament of Canada, 2007) describes the political history of 
Afghanistan, as well as their system of government. The history of Afghan politics, focusing on the 20th & 
21st century has developed significantly during this period. Divisions within “religious, regional, linguistic 
and ethnic lines” (pp. 1) has affected Afghan politics historically.  Strong central governance is not 
something that defines the history of Afghanistan. Divided by many different regions based on some of 
the above-mentioned divisions, combined with rough geographical conditions of the country, no leaders 
have succeeded so far in effective central governance. In fact the Taliban is probably the best example of 
a successful force within the country, essentially ruling the majority of the country’s regions acting as 
government in those areas, where official central governance were confined to areas not in control of the 
Taliban. 
 
Independence, border contention and resistance to reform 
After many eras of invasions, the latest being Great Britain, Afghanistan won their independence in 1919. 
In 1933, Mohammad Zahir Shah overthrew King Amanullah, who tried to implement secularizing reforms 
in Afghanistan. By 1964, King Zahir Shah started to experiment with democracy, which consisted of partial 
elected legislature. In the time of these democratic experiments extremist parties were created, one of 
those being the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan), which was considered communist and 
had relations to the Soviet Union. In 1973 Mohammad Daoud, Afghanistan’s prior Prime, initiated a 
military coup where he relieved King Zahir Shah from the throne. In the period 1973 to 1978, he attempted 
to implement social and economic reforms, but did not achieve to do so. PDPA overthrew Daoud in 1978, 
and murdered him. Having gained power, the PDPA attempted to implement reforms based on inspiration 
from Marxism. These reforms were opposed to and insurgencies were established, which essentially 
encouraged the Russians to interfere in 1979, where they inserted Babrak Karmal as the new prime 
minister and gradually inserted 120000 soldiers into the country. 
 
The Russian Invasion 
The Mujahideen, who were Afghan freedom fighters battling the Soviet Union, and who received financial 
and material aid through Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, all coordinated secretly by the United states of 
America, led coordinated attacks on the government during the 70’s. The Mujahideen was so successful 
in fighting the Soviet Union, that they withdrew their forces in 1989. By 1992, where Najibullah in the 
meantime had replaced Karmal, the Mujahideen had now gained control over the government. 
 
 
3.3 The rise of the Taliban 
 
1996 saw the rise of the Taliban whom at the time, were supported by the Pakistani government both in 
terms of military assistance but also financially (Akhtar, N., 2008). It has since then become infamous 
around the world for their actions in Afghanistan, and for harboring terrorists. Several factors has led to 
the formation of the Taliban, we will try to explore a few. 
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Afghanistan is a country that throughout its history has seen much war and has developed into a warrior 
tribe society especially among the Pashtun group (Afsar, Samples and Wood, 2008). A way of showing 
how much fighting has been done with the Pashtuns is the saying that has arisen: “A Pashtun is never at 
peace, except when he is at war.” (Afsar, Samples and Wood, 2008) 
 
When the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, came into power in 1978, they were met 
with strong resistance from the conservative elements, who were led by the Mujahideen. They became 
such a problem that the Soviet Union deployed its troops in 1979 (Afsar, Samples and Wood, 2008). This 
action would lead to a 10 year occupation. When the soviet forces were forced to retreat and clear 
themselves from Afghanistan, they were in such a hurry that much of the equipment was left behind, 
which in turn gave the Mujahideen a lot of firepower (Akhtar, N., 2008). Even six months after the Soviet 
retreat, they still supplied the government with weapons and ammunition.  
 
After the Soviet retreated a civil war erupted, much of this can be attributed to the differences between 
the various Mujahideen groups differences quickly emerging (Afsar, Samples and Wood, 2008). This in 
turn meant that the various groups got different leader whom over time became what is essentially 
warlords. Thinking that the fragmented and mostly destroyed country was finally ready to see peace 
instead faced a new kind of threat. 
 
The population being extremely war-weary meant that the environment was ideal for the Taliban (Afsar, 
Samples and Wood, 2008). Several madrassa students started to adopt ultra conservative approaches to 
various issues, the madrassa students called themselves the Taliban (Afsar, Samples and Wood, 2008). 
They quickly gained popularity among the populace especially among the Pashtuns after they proclaimed 
a march for peace. 
 
In 1994 the Taliban seized control of Kandahar and the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Muhammad Omar, 
proclaimed himself “leader of the faithful” (Afsar, Samples and Wood, 2008). In 1997 the Taliban 
controlled more than 95% of the country. Pakistan whom had supported the Taliban during these years 
started fearing that the Taliban’s extremist views would spread the Pakistani government stopped giving 
support to them (Akhtar, N., 2008). The Taliban government decided to ask for help rebuilding their war 
torn country, but none was ever given. This in turn meant that the country remained destroyed. When 
the U.S coalition forces invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan had to make a choice whether to support and offer 
shelter to the Taliban or side with the U.S coalition. While they sided with the coalition, there were still 
many supporters of the Taliban on the Pakistani border (Akhtar, N., 2008). 
 
3.4 UN resolutions, the ISAF mission and the discourse on negotiations 
 
Following the US invasion of Afghanistan as a retaliation of the terrorist attack in New York 2001, a 
conference was held in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the re-establishment of an Afghan government. One of 
the points of the Bonn conference as can be seen in the Annex 1, is the deployment of an UN mandated 
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force. This force was envisioned to secure the city of Kabul and surrounding areas, and perhaps later on 
other central areas in the country (Afghan Bonn Agreement, 2001). 
 
On December 20 2001, the UN resolution 1386 authorizes the deployment of an International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), for six months. The main objective of this force was to create security for the 
Afghan Interim Authority and the UN personal to operate.  UN defined points of action including efforts 
to fight the terrorist cells residing in Afghanistan, constituting a threat to international security and called 
upon member nations to provide military and financial support to ISAF (Resolution 1386, 2001).   
 
Six months later, the UN Security council reaffirms resolution 1386 and emphasize their strong 
commitment to secure Afghanistan’s sovereignty and extend authorization by another six months, while 
stressing the continuous need for military and financial aid (Resolution 1413, 2002).  
 
By 2003 the ISAF mission is expanded to urban areas beyond Kabul and aim to demobilize armed factions 
and to reconstitute the Afghan National Army and police force. At this point the UN recognizes constrains 
on implementing the original envisions of the mission as of the Bonn Agreement, due to security concerns. 
Authorization for ISAF operation is extended by another twelve months (Resolution 1510, 2003). 
 
By August 2003, NATO took over ISAF command, which had previously been led by various ISAF members.  
 
By September 2014, UN emphasizes the need for a functional Afghan government and efforts towards 
conducting free and fair elections. The imposing threat of narcotics production and trade in Afghanistan 
is also recognized. Security concerns regarding elections are raised and NATO employs a strategy establish 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s) (Resolution, 1563, 2004). By October 2004 ISAF operations had 
expanded into nine northern Afghan provinces and expected to expand further, within a short period. On 
September 13th, 2004 UN shifts its position regarding the Afghans security from being their own 
responsibility. Instead this responsibility would now lie upon ISAF in cooperation with the Afghan 
Government. UN furthermore emphasizes the importance of completing a full disarmament, 
demobilization of illegal armed groups within the country and extends ISAF authorization by additional 
twelve months (Resolution 1623, 2005).  
 
By February 2005, NATO announces expansions of ISAF missions into western regions, which would bring 
the amount of PRT’s up to nine, enabling them to provide security and assistance to 50% the Afghans. Six 
months later additional troops were deployed to support elections, and by then plans toward expanding 
ISAF operations further south were presented. In 2006 a new resolution is made and for the first time 
since 2001, Taliban and Al-Qaeda is mentioned, whereas previous threats were mentioned simply as 
“armed factions”. UN emphasizes the importance of efforts against these two groups, alongside the 
continuous drug trade and production and other extremist groups. UN also emphasizes its commitment 
to support the government and stresses the importance of enabling the Afghan people’s right to 
determine their own future (Resolution 1659, 2006).  
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By July 2006, ISAF had taken command of US-led Coalition forces in southern Afghan regions bringing the 
amount of soldiers up to 20.000. By October ISAF had expanded to eastern regions, enabling them to 
provide security in all of Afghanistan.  
 
In 2007 the Afghan government demands the departure of two political officers whom allegedly had been 
reaching out to Taliban members. The officers claimed that they had merely talked with tribal elders and 
individuals within the government opposition (Gall, 2007). Six years into the conflict and still frowned 
upon to take up talks with the insurgent groups… Supported by a quote "For years, the United States 
rejected talks with the Taliban in the belief that it could defeat them." (Keating, M. & Waldman, M., 2013). 
This arguably explains why the officers were relieved of their duty.  
 
By 2008, the international community brought focus on links between the armed insurgents and the 
narcotics trade and production, pressing for coordination between sub-national, national, international 
and regional levels to compromise this threat (Resolution 1817, 2008).  
 
Talks with the Taliban are not mentioned in the media before 2008, where the President of Afghanistan 
expresses his hope for the Saudi Royal family to help facilitate the Taliban into peaceful negotiations, 
however Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, called upon the Afghans to continue their holy war on the US 
and their allies (Burns, F. John, 2008).  
 
An article published February 1st, 2009 in the New York Times, argues how US efforts on changing the 
equation and initiate talks with the Taliban, requires to analyze factors driving extremist groups such as 
the Taliban, if a political solution was to be found. A step in the right direction would include shutting 
down the Guantanamo (as promised by Obama), to signal willingness to deal with these groups (Roy 
Oliver, 2009). 
 
By October 2009, resolution 1890 stresses how the Afghan Government should exercise efforts towards 
promoting its accountability, transparency and to fight corruption within the Government. ISAF 
authorization is further extended by twelve months and the UN realize how ISAF require further 
strengthening to succeed (Resolution 1890, 2009). 
 
In resolution 1917, 2010, dialogue is mentioned for the first time, indicating UN support for efforts 
towards facilitating a dialogue between the Afghan government and any opposing groups willing to break 
ties to Al-Qaeda and renounce any terrorism, violent acts and violations on human rights. First indication 
of thoughts about a non-military solution, however emphasis on the importance on fighting insurgent 
groups are still made (Resolution, 1917, 2010).  
 
In 2011, President Hamid Karzai and his cabinet announce that they will drop all negotiations with the 
Taliban, as they do not believe Taliban leaders to be serious about negotiations, referring to leaders of 
the Pakistani Taliban, having failed to locate Mullah Omar and facilitate negotiations. Another spoiler was 
the assassination of the Peace Council chairman Mr. Rabbani, allegedly carried out by the Pakistani 
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Taliban, supported by Pakistani officials, driving US and Afghan leaders to accuse Pakistan of undermining 
US interests in the region (Nissenbaum Dion & Abi-Habib, 2011). 
 
By the end of 2012 UN stresses the importance of strengthening Afghan ownership and leadership within 
all fields of governance, while still increasing their accountability and transparency. An agreement is made 
between the government and ISAF to gradually transfer military security from ISAF to the Afghan 
government by 2014. The security threat is still considered vast and UN describes efforts towards taking 
greater precautions as children are now employed by the Taliban. Furthermore it is mentioned how an 
increasing number of Taliban members has reconciled with the Afghan government and rejected their 
former terrorist ideology, supporting a peaceful solution (Resolution 2069, 2012).  
 
A New York Times article from October, 2012, describes how American generals conclude that 
negotiations before pending ISAF pullout in 2014, is unrealistic and how they will attempt to set the stage 
for negotiations after their departure. Earlier in 2012 talks between the US and Taliban had been 
conducted, but failed. They wanted five Taliban top leaders released in exchange for an American 
prisoner, however as negotiations collapsed, serious talks now seemed even further away (Editorial, NY 
Times, 2012). 
 
Michael Hirsh (2014) argues how Americans are led to believe that US forces will wind down by the end 
of 2014, when in fact they won’t. He describes how US has desires to pull out of the nation’s longest war, 
however not able to since the insurgent groups keep terrorizing larger parts of Afghanistan. Even given 
the fact that the Afghan National army is approximately 10 times larger than the Taliban’s, it still remains 
unqualified to sustain security in Afghanistan on its own. ISAF commanders have stated how air, counter-
IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) and logistics support, is still required. Lt. Gen. Nick Carter even stated 
how ISAF would realistically be active beyond 2018, not optimistic about results by then, contradicting 
White House statements claiming withdrawal by the end of 2014. Carter describes Afghanistan's future 
as "stable instability" meaning that the government won't have much connection to the country outside 
of Kabul, and will remain weak and corrupt. While the Obama Administration is allegedly pulling out 
troops by the end of 2014, the President of Afghanistan has revealed that up to nine military bases will 
still be used by US and ISAF forces beyond 2014. Carter confirmed this saying that ISAF will need them for 
air support, headquarters and training facilities (Hirsh M. 2014). 
 
It is clear how the initial mission and mandate for ISAF operations changed during the course of the 
conflict, and did not foresee the magnitude of complexity in preliminary expectations. Narcotics 
production and trade was underestimated and the US was determined to be victorious without 
negotiating with terrorists. The discourse and UN resolutions clearly demonstrate how much they 
underestimated the capabilities of various actors alongside the complexities involved, forcing the US to 
accept possibilities of negotiated settlement.  
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3.5 Afghan politics – a contemporary overview and context 
 
3.5.1 The Afghan system of government 
 
Afghanistan consists of 34 provinces, where the president is head of government and state. The president 
as well as the two vice presidents both serve for 5 years and are elected directly. In scenarios where no 
candidates have more than 50% of the votes in round one, the constitution then assures a second round 
to be held between those two candidates with the highest amount of votes. Presidents are only allowed 
to serve two terms in total. If needed it is possible for the government to summon Loya Jirga in instances 
where interpretations or change to the constitution are required, alongside critical national issues and 
war declarations (Parliament of Canada, 2007).   
 
3.5.2 The current political situation of Afghanistan 
 
September 29th, 2014, the 13th president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, a former finance 
minister, was elected (Panda, A., 2014). The presidential election ended after a two round election 
between former president Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. “With Ghani’s inauguration, 
Afghanistan marks its first peaceful and democratic transfer of power between two governments”(ibid.). 
In addition to the election, Abdullah Abdullah was introduced as the country’s chief executive. This role 
was created as a part of a unity government deal to resolve the draw between the two presidential 
candidates, brokered by the United States (Panda, A., 2014). The following day on September 30th the 
BSA (Bilateral Security Agreement) was signed by the new president, previously denied by former 
president Karzai, stating that it was a job for the president who would precede him. The BSA allows for 
9,800 American as well as 2000 NATO/ISAF troops to remain after December 31st. The purpose of those 
troops are to assist Afghan security forces, as well as train them. In addition to that the agreement also 
allows American Special Operations forces to conduct counterterrorism missions. Mr. Ghani also called 
upon the Taliban in his inauguration speech to establish peace talks, however pointing out that the Taliban 
should not consider the invitation “as a sign of weakness, and that his government would respond 
forcefully to any attacks on civilians” (Ahmed, A. & Walsh, D., 2014). The Taliban does not recognize the 
BSA and denounces it as a “sinister plot by the United States” and thereby utilized the denunciation of 
the BSA as their “first propaganda assault on the new Ghani administration”. The Taliban state as follows 
“With this action, the new staff of the presidential palace have proved their disloyalty to the religion and 
history of Afghanistan”, followed by a post stating “Death to America!” (Ahmed, A. & Walsh, D., 2014). 
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4: Analysis 
 
4.1 Actors 
 
The conflict in Afghanistan has many actors involved. Some are core actors and some characterized as 
peripheral actors, none of which is prone to accept any given outcome of the conflict. In short, all actors 
identified and described here are relevant to any negotiated settlement and must be considered in any 
outcome of the conflict. In this section, we will be covering their relevance to the conflict and identify 
desired outcomes of a negotiated solution to the conflict, based on empirical data from two different peer 
reviewed research papers. 
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4.1.1 Countries, regions and Afghan internal actors in the conflict1: 
 
Not all ISAF participant countries are listed here, probably most notably Canada. The vast majority of the 
remaining falls under the categorization Europe, UK included. Europe is considered a single actor rather 
than a widespread of individual actors within the continent. 
  
We have combined the categorization of actors from Waldman (2013) and Dobbins, J. & Shinn, J. (2011), 
to display the broad aspect of actors in the conflict, without compromising relevance and interpretation 
of the empirical data. 
 
Due to limitation constraints, the actors are further described in Appendix 1, where their relevance to the 
conflict and their desired outcomes are described more thoroughly. 
 
Identified actors            
  
·         Afghan government 
·         Afghan Population 
·         Afghan Taliban 
·         Northern groups 
·         United States of America 
·         Europe 
·         Pakistan 
·         India 
·         China 
·         Russia 
·         Saudi Arabia* 
·         Iran* 
·         Turkey* 
·         Central Asia (CA) 
-          Kazakhstan 
-          Kyrgyzstan 
-          Tajikistan 
-          Turkmenistan 
-          Uzbekistan 
·         Western Asia (WA) 
*Western Asia actors considered key actors 
-          Armenia 
-          Azerbaijan 
                                               
1 Based on two peer reviewed research papers (Dobbins, J. & Shinn, J., 2011)/ (Waldman, M. & Wright, 
M., 2014)  
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-          Bahrain 
-          Cyprus 
-          Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) 
-          Georgia 
-          Iran* 
-          Iraq 
-          Israel 
-          Jordan 
-          Kuwait 
-          Lebanon 
-          Oman 
-          Qatar 
-          Saudi Arabia* 
-          Syria 
-          Turkey* 
-          United Arab Emirates 
-          Yemen 
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4.1.2 Mapping categorizing actors in the conflict 
 
In order to visualize the actors’ relevance to the conflict we will draw upon an approach dividing the actors 
into four layers, described in Figure 1: The Core, The Inner Ring, The First Ring and The Second Ring 
(Dobbins, J. & Shinn, J., 2011). As we consider more actors relevant to the conflict (Waldman, M. & Wright, 
M., 2014), we have added a fifth layer defined as peripheral actors. 
 
Figure 1 shows how the actors can be interpreted through different layers of influence in the conflict, 
based on their interests and ability to participate or influence. 
 
 
Figure 1. Created by group based on (Dobbins, J. & Shinn, J., 2011) 
 
Figure two has been created as an attempt to illustrate the complexity of the conflict and which channels 
the actors are likely to use to influence the course of a negotiation, based on the empirical data (Appendix 
1). Some actors are directly linked, while all actors are linked through the inner circle or “the core”. The 
color schemes is based on table one’s categorization of the five layers of actors. ISAF/UN for the purpose 
of interpretation has been added to this table as an actor to demonstrate how the US, Europe and Turkey’s 
influence primarily will be executed through UN/ISAF mandate, however we don’t consider them as a 
single actor as such in the conflict.  
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Figure 2. Created by group 
 
 
Identified desired outcomes 
Given the restrictions of the project we have limited descriptions of actors in the conflict to point-by-point 
desired outcomes. Further details on the actors in the conflict are outlined in Appendix 1. 
 
First we present desired outcomes of the actors. Secondly we briefly discuss the obvious complexity and 
contentions of desired outcomes. Thirdly, being aware of the limitations of the extent of desired outcomes 
identified, we draw on the more generalized categorization of desired outcomes by Waldman & Wright 
(2014), describing how divergence and convergence exists within these desires. Finally we conclude on 
this section.  
 
The Core: 
 
Afghan Taliban: 
 
- Withdrawal of western military forces 
- Weak support towards a transitory international peace keeping force 
- Security for all members of their organization 
- Being removed from international terrorist lists 
- International recognition of Taliban as a legitimate political group in Afghanistan 
- Implementation of Sharia Law 
- Removal of corrupt internal Afghan actors, possibly including prosecutions of specific warlords 
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Afghan Government: 
 
- ISAF & US military departure in realistic stages 
- Strong support for a temporary International peacekeeping force, compensating for ISAF withdrawal 
- Continuous flow of international financial aid to Afghanistan 
- Preservation of the constitution in its current state (with possible minor alterations) 
- Preservation of democracy 
- Establishment of a "power-sharing" arrangement, where non-Pashtuns are involved to prevent another 
civil war (including Northern leaders) 
 
The Inner Ring  
 
Pakistan 
 
Desired outcomes depends on which of two narratives proves to be correct (further described in Appendix 
1) 
 
1st Narrative: 
- To prevent or stop all activities and influences of India in Afghanistan 
- Securing a large role for the its allies in the Taliban in the governance of Afghanistan (enabling them to 
undermine India) 
- Continuous US financial and military support to Pakistan 
- Removal of western forces from Afghanistan 
- Cease fire on drone strikes on Afghan/Pakistani borders 
 
2nd Narrative: 
- A stable government with inclusion of the Afghan Taliban (however not too significantly) 
- American and Afghan support towards fighting terrorist and insurgency groups posing a threat to 
Pakistan 
- Drawback of western forces in a respectfully timely manner 
- Continuous US financial and military support to Pakistan 
- Limit rather than denial of Indian influence in Afghanistan 
- Access to trade and investments in and with Afghanistan 
 
 
US 
 
- Establishment of a stable, independent and friendly Afghanistan 
- Prevention of sanctuary opportunities for terrorist organizations inside of Afghanistan 
- Avoidance of further destabilizing of Pakistan. 
- Securing of basic human rights and the right to vote 
- Preserving NATO credibility 
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- Efforts towards fighting and limiting the Afghan drug trade and its spillover effects 
 
The First Ring 
 
India 
 
- Non-Pakistani proxy dominated government 
- Neutral/friendly Afghan state 
- Securing basic human rights for Afghans 
- Prevention of sanctuary opportunities for terrorist organizations inside of Afghanistan 
 (Especially in regard to Pakistani based insurgencies) 
- Allowance of Indian presence (civilian) in Afghanistan and counter insurgency intelligence (military) 
- Political influence 
- Further access to trade and investments in Afghanistan 
- Preserving and extending Indian partnership with the US 
 
 
Iran 
 
- US & ISAF forces removal (intelligence operations included) 
- A friendly state with limited Pakistani influence, including that of their proxies 
- Security of rights and interests of long-time allies to Iran inside of Afghanistan 
- Access to investment and trade with and in Afghanistan 
- Stability to ensure possible return of Afghan refugees in Iran 
- Counter insurgency support from Afghanistan 
- Efforts towards fighting and limiting the Afghan drug trade and its spillover effects 
 
Russia 
 
- Reducing capabilities of Islamic extremist groups to conduct attacks inside of Russia and towards their 
regional interests 
- Removal of US and NATO forces from CA 
- Efforts towards fighting and limiting the Afghan drug trade and its spillover effects 
- Prevention of establishment of oil and gas pipelines through southern Afghanistan 
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The Second Ring 
 
Turkey 
 
- Continuous efforts to fight terrorism 
- Access to investments in Afghanistan 
- Strengthening of political influence in the region 
- Ensuring security and interests for ethnic Turkish groups in Afghanistan 
- To increase their NATO role and influence 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
- Limitation of Iranian interests 
- Securing Pakistani interest 
- Containment of the Al-Qaeda threat by preventing sanctuary in Afghanistan 
- Support implementation of strict Sharia law 
- Support democratic decrease 
- Support a Taliban influenced governance of Afghanistan  
- Removal of western military from the region 
 
China 
 
- Decreasing the capacity of extremist Islamic groups in hurting Chinese interests 
- Withdrawal of Western military from CA 
- Supporting a Pakistani friendly government and negotiated outcome 
- Limitations on Russian and Indian capabilities in the region 
- Access to investments in gas, metal etc. 
- Stability 
- Re-enforcing the position of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in CA 
 
Europe 
 
- Early military withdrawal 
- Stability 
- Prevention of terrorist sanctuaries 
- Securing a democratic Afghan state and basic human rights 
- Efforts towards fighting and limiting the Afghan drug trade and its spillover effects 
 
  
32 
 
Peripheral Actors 
 
Central Asia (CA) 
 
- Access to export and trade opportunities 
- Efforts towards fighting and limiting the Afghan drug trade and its spillover effects 
- Stability 
 
Western Asia (WA) 
- The most relevant actors; Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are covered separately 
 
Afghan population 
 
- Stability 
- Peace and security for Afghans 
- Securing Afghan sovereignty 
- Securing basic human rights 
- Generally supports a government with Taliban power-sharing 
 
Northern groups 
 
- Influence on governance in their areas 
- Access to government funds 
- Limitation or exclusion of Taliban influence 
- Constitutional alterations with a more representative electoral system 
 
4.1.3 Summary 
 
Desired outcomes identified clearly indicates complexities and points of contention. Generally speaking 
most actors have interests in stability and security in Afghanistan, given the many spillover effects in 
relation to insurgencies and terrorism, however some actors can arguably benefit from instability as it 
undermines regional power of other actors and causes financial implications for their enemies. While 
some regional players practice cooperation with insurgency groups serving as proxies to undermine and 
damage their enemies, they still seem to suffer from instability and attacks from terrorist groups 
benefitting from sanctuaries in Afghanistan or proxies of other countries – quite a paradox. Some actors 
seek to limit or completely disrupt influence of their less friendly regional neighbors in fear of an 
imbalance, essentially undermining their own sovereignty or financial opportunities. While several actors 
has interests in securing a democratic constitution and basic human rights, others are relatively indifferent 
and few to some extent opposing in relation to those who lobby for strict or at least moderate 
implementation of Sharia law. Some actors with a desire for US and ISAF forces to be removed completely 
from the region are fully aware of the potential risks of a premature departure, should it result in another 
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civil war, however a stalemate situation where ISAF countries, particularly the US, are financially 
weakened alongside providing a negative narrative on UN capabilities, suits them fairly well.  
 
Clearly a negotiated settlement can by no means be bilateral, given the many actors and points of 
contention.  
 
4.1.4 Concluding remarks and points of “convergence” & “divergence” (Waldman, M. & 
Wright, M., 2014, pp. 10) 
 
The vast majority of desired outcomes previously presented, fits into the categorizations of interests by 
Waldman & Wright (2014). In order to briefly present these and show the points of convergence and 
divergence identified (ibid.), we draw on a graphical presentation of these presented as Table 1. This 
perspective clearly indicates how a high degree of convergence exist in relation to security issues and on 
the contrary how interests of regional actors indicates a high degree of divergence. One can argue by 
analyzing this narrative, how the course of the conflict to a low degree is about providing peace and 
security for Afghans and to a high degree about demonstrating power and/or exploiting stalemates to 
undermine competing actors influence and prospects of fruitful outcomes. Ironically and somewhat 
contradictory, everyone seems to agree that another civil war or state collapse should be avoided, given 
the many spill-over effects. Further complicating any conceivable solution, The Taliban and other 
insurgencies serve as proxies amongst actors and fight to demonstrate their power and desire to secure 
adherence to their cause(s), seeking to undermine western and even regional influence. The magnitude 
of complexity and political depth this conflict has, is simply unquestionable. Any negotiated settlement 
seems to require political and diplomatic management with ‘surgical precision’.  
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Table 1. (Waldman, M. & Wright, M., 2014, pp. 10) 
 
4.2 Internal Dynamics of Decision-making 
 
Much of the discourse regarding negotiations as a part of the final solution for Afghanistan is based on a 
Rational Actor view of the involved parties. There is an underlying assumption that each party will engage 
in negotiations with a perspective of value maximization, i.e. the parties will take stances and approach 
negotiations with the aim of achieving rationally deduced goals. We consider this to be a practical 
perspective in order to justify the rationale for negotiations, however it does not necessarily reflect how 
the involved parties will act in reality. Applying Allisons (1969) conceptual models of decision-making, we 
will attempt to deduce how the involved parties are likely to act in an actual negotiation and its 
ramifications for the success of eventual negotiations. 
 
4.2.1 Taliban 
 
The structure of the Taliban is something that has changed a great deal post 9/11. At the start of the US 
invasion it was very centralized and there was a clear power structure. This has changed a great deal since 
now the leadership with Mullah Omar at the top cannot micromanage in the same way. He now cannot 
control the cells that are the Taliban (Afsar, Samples and Wood, 2008). Today the leader would decree 
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something which then in turn would be given to regional commanders whom would giver to their local 
leader whom in turn would hand to the individual cells. The many layers in the structure reduces the level 
of direct influence by the top leader. 
 
The reason for this is because the Taliban use the structure already in place, aka the tribal system. Here 
you have individual cells making decisions without the need for constant communication from the top. In 
other words the individual cells are small franchises (Afsar, Samples and Wood, 2008). How this works is 
that a couple of men decide to become the local Taliban, and form a cell. They gain some reputation which 
in turn gains them a seal of approval from the “main” Taliban (Afsar, Samples and Wood, 2008), this is 
one of the reasons why it is so hard for the ISAF forces to combat the Taliban since they can never know 
where a new one will emerge.  
 
This decentralized ”franchise” structure with little direct control from the top leadership and the 
operational independence of the various cells can conceivably lead to internal competition between 
various Taliban factions. When the top leadership makes decisions it needs to take into consideration the 
needs and demands of its various regional factions. Each group, while supporting the Taliban cause, also 
works for the benefit of its own people. This can in essence be considered bureaucratic in-fighting. In this 
way the Taliban decision-making structure falls into the Bureaucratic Policy Model as outlined by Allison 
(1969). This has a direct effect on how the Taliban would act in a negotiation situation.   
 
When it comes to the negotiation situation, we are dealing with a bureaucratic kind of thinking, since the 
individual cells will try to gain the best outcome for themselves. The reason for this comes from the 
knowledge that the cells are very much self-contained and do not answer constantly to the higher ranking 
Taliban members, once again this is a left over from the tribal system. In case of the negotiation the 
individual cells leader would see what the cells’ needs. 
 
One could mention that the issue of drug trading would be on the agenda when it came time to negotiate, 
here the Taliban will very likely have internal struggles. This would be caused by the fact that there are 
some cells that deal in drugs a great deal, whereas others do not. Therefore one cell might say that it is a 
point where they would not care if it was stopped while another cell would be dependent on as a form of 
income to support themselves, in turn the Taliban would have to internally decide what its stance would 
be. What this could cause might be that the promises made might be very vague, meaning the Taliban’s 
official stance may be to commit to “looking into it”, which in turn means that they might not do anything 
about it. 
 
We argue that this goes to show how that the Taliban decision-making process is characterized by 
bargaining within the hierarchy. This means that when giving out demands the Taliban might not make 
great changes since they internally would not be able to gain support.  
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4.2.2 ISAF 
 
“It is by no means an easy task to understand the functioning of a Headquarters, often times even to those 
working within it” (Hrychuk, 2012). ISAF has its legitimacy through its mandate by the UN Security Council. 
There are three levels of command, at the top of the chain command there is the ISAF Headquarter, which 
sorts the strategic level. On a level higher is the political strategic level which is located in Brunssum, 
Netherlands, it consists of SHAPE (Supreme headquarters Allied Powers Europe) on the NATO side and 
CENTCOM (US. Central command) on the US side. COMISAF (Commander of ISAF) has the responsibility 
over the IJC (ISAF Joint Command) as well as the NATO training mission in Afghanistan and the forces 
conducting special operations. The IJC is in charge of the tactic levels as well as the regional commands 
(ibid.).  Prior to 2010 it was however different. IJF was made so that the ISAF HQ only had to focus on the 
strategic issues up to the political level, as well as out to the government of Afghanistan and other troop 
contributing nations. COMISAF had the command of the strategic aspects of the missions conducted by 
ISAF in coherence with the Afghan government and other International institutions in Afghanistan. The 
IJC was the one having the responsibility for the tactical operations throughout the country, under his 
command he had PRT´s as described in the ISAF mission chapter and the regional commands. Furthermore 
IJC also had to coordinate ISAF and ANSAF during operations. The way the structure of the command is 
made is in parallel with the USFOR-A (US Forces Afghanistan), in particular the command structure for 
OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom). The reason being is that both chain of commands is controlled by the 
same regional commander, COMISAF / Commander, USFOR-A. The OEF also has another mandate than 
ISAF which makes them able to conduct more aggressive missions in terms of counterterrorism. Heather 
Hrychuk argues that this means that if the countries behind ISAF are politically unwilling  themselves with 
the way certain operations is going to be conducted then the operation will just be put  under the US 
forces operations instead, since they have the same commander (ibid.).  
 
The fact that one commander controls two distinct forces allowing the commander to make use of one 
tool even if the other does not wish to do the required work, indicates that strategists outlining the 
structure have taken into consideration the fact that the entire force comprises of a wide spectrum of 
distinct forces entering the conflict for a wide variety of reasons. Each national contingent not only has its 
own operating procedures but also distinct set of politically motivations driving its leadership. While all 
participating ISAF nations stand behind the main mission, there is a broad array of perspectives on how 
the mission is to be accomplished and at what cost. The US for instance has a greater tolerance for 
casualties in its troops than many European nations. As each ISAF seeks to minimize casualties for its own 
troops, the decision-making process becomes reminiscent of Allison’s Bureaucratic policy model. 
 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
 
This analysis is by no means exhaustive, however it serves to prove the point that even though a certain 
course of action or a particular demand or concession may make the most rational sense and be the most 
beneficial, it is not necessary that the internal decision-making process can allow the actor to follow the 
value-maximizing course. Particularly if the primary parties in the conflict make their decision along the 
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bureaucratic policy model, the internal bargaining and competition it implies makes it increasingly 
unlikely.  
 
4.3 Power Relations 
 
4.3.1 ISAF, Taliban and Power 
 
When one power is much greater than its weaker counterpart, the weaker one would try to avoid 
negotiations at any cost and the strong one would have no need (Zartman and Rubin, 2000). 
Zartman and Rubin (2000) theorized that the stronger power would usually be more concerned with 
things that in general is much bigger issues than the smaller issues which the weaker party wants to 
address.  
There are two different schools of thought on this matter. One school speaks of how asymmetry in 
negotiations will result in the stronger party being able to control and set the agenda. Within this school 
of thought, it is generally perceived that an agreement will be reached faster than in the opposing school 
of thought and better agreements will be reached. 
The other school of thought brought forward by Zartman and Rubin (2000) is that by entering in 
negotiations the asymmetry between the two is brought to the level where the two parties are almost 
equal. When talks of negotiation is put on the table, it indicates that the parties are not far apart in terms 
of power, and that they both could benefit from an eventual negotiation. ISAF cannot maintain control in 
several areas. So one could argue that these negotiations will be entered with a weakening ISAF and a 
Taliban that might be on the rise and as such the asymmetry would not be as big as first assumed. 
This gives refers to the earlier mentioning, that if one power is too great there will be no negotiations, 
because the greater power don´t need a negotiation. Since this has only become something on the agenda 
after the earlier way of thinking clearly did not work. Even though it has been said that ISAF have already 
won the war (Waldman, M., 2010) but even then, ISAF still have high casualties and losing ground to the 
insurgents. 
One can argue that ISAF has moved in the direction of actually being weaker which would mean that the 
power relations can be argued to be almost symmetrical. One can argue that they are symmetrical since, 
both sides need the negotiation for them to be able to achieve their objectives. ISAF needs it because they 
can’t leave this war after 13 years without results. If they pulled out they would leave behind a country in 
chaos, and still being a target for terrorists as a safe haven. The Taliban on the other hand needs this 
negotiation since they are tiring after many years of war (Waldman, 2010). If ISAF pulled out it would 
mean they had not gained any international legitimacy, and would have no foreign invaders to fight, which 
would make it harder for them to recruit people for their course. 
Symmetry would mean that neither side would give up anything during the initial negotiations since they 
cannot lose any power. That would in turn mean that during the initial negotiations there would be a 
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stalemate (Jackson, 2000). This stalemate might last for a long time and would only end when both sides 
would be so tired that they would instead compromise and, reach a somewhat agreement which would 
benefit both. 
We argue that we are dealing with an asymmetrical power negotiation, since the ISAF forces has the 
support from the Afghan government, along with their superior military power, it gives them a slight 
advantage, though this can change soon and instead turn symmetrical because the power difference 
would decrease. 
Zartman and Rubin (2000) argues that a lesson should be learned is that one should never underestimate 
a person with lesser power. Even though Taliban has fewer people it has proved able to take over villages 
which ISAF was in control of. 
A lesson that might be important to remember is not to use power to force their way through negotiations 
since this might result in an agreement that even though might be useable will probably break down at a 
later point (Zartman and Rubin, 2000).  Also should power be flaunted and showed often, this might put 
whomever is on the other side on the defensive even going so far as to them becoming antagonistic 
(Zartman and Rubin, 2000). 
What if one takes a look from the Taliban’s side of things? Well they have several ways to become stronger 
or to, at the very least make ISAF become less powerful. One way would be for the Taliban to make the 
right friends (Zartman and Rubin, 2000), this might include making deals with certain high standing local 
people. They could even go to Pakistan and India to find support for various purposes. Having the right 
friends could in turn mean that added pressure would be put upon the opponents of said negotiations. 
This is also a slight bit risky since no person nor organization, is without purpose (Zartman and Rubin, 
2000). This would mean that the people dealing with these third parties would be to try to understand 
what they would try and gain and then use this as a way to get your way (Zartman and Rubin, 2000). 
Something that also could be useful to remember is that, one can have the greatest amount of power but 
still not be the most powerful one at certain negotiations (Zartman and Rubin, 2000). What is meant by 
this is that on certain issues the Taliban might be the more powerful party. An example might be that a 
certain region controlled by the Taliban, would need a new hospital ISAF would of course try to be seen 
as the ones to build it and be the controlling party. Here it might actually be better to look at the most 
powerful party which in this case would be the Taliban since they control the area. So in this case may be 
asking the Taliban questions and letting them control might be the better option. 
A thing that must be mentioned in this section on power is Pakistan. The Pakistani military have ties with 
insurgent groups within Afghanistan, this in turn means that if the Pakistani government dislikes the 
direction the negotiations are taking, they would be able to disrupt the negotiations with insurgents 
(Waldman, M., 2013). Because of this connection they would be able to, influence the negotiations with 
the Taliban. This in turn means that when talking power one must consider that not all power would come 
from the actor itself but also from its allies. So how much should be done for the Pakistani government? 
One must consider that they are not the Taliban therefore everything should not be done to keep them 
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happy, but one should be careful not to exclude them nor turn to much to India since this might make 
them use their influence over the Taliban. 
 
4.3.2 Conclusion: 
 
As Jackson’s (2000) study concludes, the best circumstances for a successful negotiation is when there is 
a certain level of power differential between the involved parties. While it is not possible to accurately 
measure power differential given both the difficulty of defining power and how to measure it, we can 
make some assumptions as to whether the current scenario indicates a more favorable power differential 
now than previously. With the pressure of making an honorable exit from Afghanistan hanging over the 
coalition and the resurgence of the Taliban as something more than just a disruptive insurgency, 
indications are that the differential has reduced. We therefore conclude that even though there is no way 
of determining the power differential is ideal, it is certainly more favorable than before  and given the 
trajectory it may not be long before it achieves symmetry, which would be less conducive to a negotiated 
settlement. 
 
4.4 Timing and Environment of Negotiations 
 
In this part we analyze the conditions for the timing and the environment of any possible negotiations to 
determine their effects on the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan.  
 
The Contingency Framework places both aspects in the concurrent cluster of variables affecting the 
success of a conflict resolution process. We will seek to determine whether the present moment presents 
the stage of the conflict indicating the “ripeness” (Zartman, 1985) of the involved parties to conduct 
meaningful negotiations. In the eventuality that negotiations are held at the present moment, we also 
look at what environment such negotiations would take place in.  
 
When looking at the timing of a negotiation, Jackson’s (2000) research corroborates Zartman’s (1985) 
concept that there is a certain stage in a conflict that presents the most fortuitous time for the holding of 
negotiations. This time occurs when the conflicting parties have suffered a certain amount of damages to 
make the idea of a negotiated settlement more palatable and before the conflict becomes entrenched at 
which point the hostility between the parties has escalated to a level where a negotiated settlement 
becomes unthinkable to for at least one of the parties. 
 
Jackson (2000) concludes that the “ripe” moment generally occurs approximately in the period between 
13 and 36 months into the conflict. If taken as the invariable truth, it would seem that the best time for 
negotiations in Afghanistan has long passed. One must look at the numbers critically however. Jackson’s 
study covers 171 conflicts in which negotiations have been attempted in a time period spanning 1945 to 
1995. It is safe to assume that the nature of warfare has changed significantly during this period. The 
Afghan conflict differs in nature on account of its guerilla insurgency characteristics from most conflicts 
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taking place across the globe in the duration specified by Jackson’s research. It is therefore not necessary 
that the timeframe for “ripeness” indicated by his research is entirely applicable to this conflict. While we 
can disregard the specific timeframes, we do however hold the broader conclusion to be true, that the 
best time for successful talks comes at a time when the involved parties have suffered enough damage 
and been involved in the conflict long enough but not too much or too long. 
 
Matt Waldman (2010) argued in 2010 that the time for negotiations was as ideal as could be hoped. With 
the US as the leading actor dominating the course of international forces he concluded that the Obama 
administration’s perspective on negotiations with the Taliban for a peaceful settlement was markedly 
different from the Bush administration. Where the Bush administration completely rejected the idea of 
negotiations, believing that “total victory” was not only possible, but indeed inevitable given the 
combined might of the international forces in comparison to the rag-tag loosely knit Taliban insurgency 
with a fighting infrastructure far inferior to that mustered by ISAF. The assumption of quick and decisive 
victory is evident from the very short timeframes given by the UN mandates for action in Afghanistan. As 
the conflict drew out however, the quick victory proved elusive and the campaign continued to require 
substantial investment in personnel and material.  The expense of the war and the increasing opposition 
at home to US involvement in international conflict, moved the Obama administration to be more 
favorably inclined to a negotiated settlement. Indeed the subsequent announcement by Obama that he 
would initiate US pullout from Afghanistan during his time in office made the idea of negotiations even 
more likely. While some NATO and ISAF members continue to reject the idea of negotiations with the 
Taliban, the US attitude towards a negotiated settlement is pivotal in determining whether the 
international forces are likely to engage in negotiations. Waldman (2010) therefore concludes that this is 
the right time for negotiations.  
 
Waldman also argues that the Taliban, while still committed to expelling all international forces from 
Afghanistan, are beginning to show signs of fatigue and war-weariness. Though the Taliban has 
experienced a surge in their power, the fatigue cannot be discounted. Indeed Waldman’s research 
indicates that the Taliban have passed the point where they were convinced of complete victory in their 
mission through armed conflict and have suffered enough casualties and no clear victory in order to be 
able to see the possibilities of a negotiated settlement. 
 
The Afghan National Government also has reached a point where they must begin to consider a 
negotiated settlement. Initially the government under Hamid Karzai utterly rejected the notion of 
negotiating with the Taliban, going so far as to expel two diplomats for allegedly talking with the Taliban 
in 2007 (Gall, 2007). It is worth noting that this is prior to the change in US administration and the 
subsequent thawing in the “no negotiations” stance which in all likelihood the Afghan National 
Government was echoing. As the Taliban have surged back to become a decisive player again, and with 
their increasing influence on individual members of the Afghan National Government, the amenability to 
negotiations has increased. Indeed Ashraf Ghani, the recently elected president of Afghanistan called on 
the Taliban to join peace talks in his inauguration speech. 
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It is also important to note that the timing for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban also matters in 
terms of Pakistan. Though Pakistan is not directly involved in the fighting its internal doctrine of strategic 
depth in Afghanistan through the Taliban has ensured its overt and covert involvement in the Afghan 
Conflict. Pakistan, however is facing trouble at home with the Pakistani Taliban, and its military is currently 
engaged in a campaign to root out militants in the North Waziristan district bordering Afghanistan, long 
held to be a safe base of operations for Al Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban (Yousaf et al. 2014) 
. For Pakistan there may be an advantage in supporting a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan in order 
to reduce the intensity and duration of the conflict in North Waziristan, as a negotiated settlement in 
Afghanistan is very likely to have a direct effect on the activities of the Taliban across the border in 
Pakistan. 
 
Regarding the timing of negotiations, it seems that there is a certain amenability from all involved parties 
in terms of holding talks at the present time. There are indications that the conflict, in spite of it long 
duration has not yet reached a point of intractability. As such it is not the timing of the negotiations that 
precludes a negotiated settlement, but rather key points of dispute on which the parties are unable to 
budge. 
 
In terms of the environment of negotiations very little can be said with surety in terms of the Afghan 
conflict. At the present moment both the Taliban and the afghan national government (and through that 
the international community) are making public calls for peace. This can at best be considered “arm’s 
length negotiations” (Jackson, 2000).  
 
Attempts have been made to set up a neutral site for negotiations, most recently in Qatar where the 
Taliban set up an office in June 2013. The objective had been to create better conditions for the holding 
of peace talks. However the Qatar office was abandoned a month later as disagreement arose on the 
Taliban raising the Taliban flag over the office and placing a sign on the office declaring it the office of the 
“Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (CBSNEWS, 2013).  
 
The US and the Afghan National Government objected to the Taliban presenting the office as one of a 
sovereign government rather than a political office of a group or movement. This is the closest the parties 
have come to the setting up of a neutral site for talks. Communication between the parties since then has 
again been reduced to arms-length negotiation with Qatar brokering the agreement for the release of 5 
Taliban commanders interred in Guantanamo in exchange for the release of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in 
2014. Other countries have also offered to act as the neutral site for negotiations including Turkey and 
most recently China. While some neutral sites may be preferable to one party or the other, this is not the 
key issue in terms of the environment. As Jackson (2000) notes, neutral sites are more conducive to 
successful negotiations than composite sites, however the most effective negotiations are those that are 
conducted on one of the other party’s territory. The arms-length negotiation that has characterized the 
process is the least conducive and indicates hostility to the process of negotiations itself. The setting up 
of a neutral site indicates a greater faith in the process of negotiation even if the level of mistrust between 
the parties remains the same.  
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In terms of the environment therefore, there seems to be little reason to expect a successfully negotiated 
settlement, no matter how fortuitous the time for negotiations are. The basic mistrust and hostility to 
each other as exhibited by the inability of the parties to find even a neutral site for negotiations makes a 
negotiated settlement increasingly unlikely. 
 
4.4.1 Conclusion: 
 
In regards to the timing and environment in which negotiations may take place, we come to two 
contradictory findings. There is evidence that at present the timing for negotiations is conducive to a 
negotiated settlement, however the failure to create an environment that allows for the frank and trusting 
exchange of proposals in the search for an acceptable solution indicates that efforts to find a negotiated 
solution are unlikely to bear fruit. As a result we must conclude that in relation to the concurrent variables, 
while the factor of timing may indicate chances of success the issue of environment seems to exclude the 
possibility. 
 
4.5 Outcomes 
 
The consequent cluster of variables focus on the outcomes of conflict resolution. We have amended the 
framework to allow us to analyze a broader spectrum of possible outcomes. Each of these aspects of 
outcomes give us an insight into the final shape of an eventual negotiated settlement or at least set some 
parameters for its eventual shape and nature. 
 
4.5.1 Agreement 
 
Can a formal agreement be formulated between the parties in this conflict? Underdal (2002, in Kremeyuk) 
explains that an agreement in negotiation literature can have two distinct meetings. It can be taken as an 
informal understanding between the parties or as formally enshrined statements of commitments by the 
parties to which they bind themselves. In looking at this aspect in the context of the afghan conflict two 
things come to light. Firstly, irrespective of how many parties are part of the actual negotiation process 
or how many have interests they wish addressed, given the official stance that ISAFs mandate is to support 
the Afghan National Government any official negotiated settlement will be between the National 
Government and the Taliban. This however brings us to the second issue regarding the nature of the 
Taliban as a cohesive political unit. The Afghan National government has a formal internal structure 
determined by the country’s constitution. This means that any agreement made by the Afghan 
Government is institutional and entered into by the position and not the person so to speak. The same 
cannot be said of the Taliban. It is difficult to pin down precisely the institutional structure of the Taliban 
on account of the tribal culture pervasive in the group and the fact that being an insurgent group they are 
required to maintain a great deal of secrecy regarding their internal structure for their own security. Some 
attempts have been made by analysts to define the structure. The Taliban have been described as “a 
network of franchises, an arrangement that fits well with tribal traditions” (Afsar. S, Samples C., Wood T., 
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2008 Military Review). This indicates that the Taliban organizational structure is not institutionalized. As 
a result it is difficult to imagine that any formal agreement will carry the same level of institutional 
commitment that it would from the Afghan Government side. 
 
We therefore expect that any agreement resulting from negotiations will be considered a “meeting of 
minds” (Underdal 2002 in Kremenyuk). This may set the stage for further talks and allow the Taliban to 
come out as a formally recognized political force in Afghanistan as Waldman (2010) expects their desire 
to be. However since the agreement is not likely to formalize any specific commitments, its value may be 
questioned unless it can generate enough momentum to ultimately lead to a formalized agreement. 
 
4.5.1.1 Conclusion 
 
In terms of the nature of the agreement resulting from a negotiated settlement, the expected informality 
of it (at least until the Taliban leadership structure is formalized and integrated into the Afghan political 
scenario) lacks a certain level of commitment from at least one of the parties. While this may be accepted 
as a good first step in the right direction, it does not actually hold the guarantees within it required to be 
considered a “complete” settlement. Given the challenges and chances of collapse of the agreement 
before it can be formalized, we must conclude that a “complete” negotiated settlement is still unlikely 
under the given circumstances. 
 
4.5.2 Efficiency 
 
Will a possible agreement be efficient? To evaluate the efficiency we must look at the integrative potential 
of a possible agreement. This means we must look at whether an eventual agreement increases the 
benefits of the involved parties beyond those they would gain in their BATNA (Best Alternative To 
Negotiated Agreement). In this part we will briefly look at what some of the alternatives that lie before 
the various parties. 
 
Immediately it would appear that ISAF’s alternatives to a negotiated settlement are not entirely 
unacceptable. Firstly, ISAF’s mandate is to support the Afghan National Government. This mandate of 
support shifts responsibility for the future stability of the country from the international community to 
the newly elected National Government particularly in terms of security, responsibility of which was 
handed over to the Afghan National Security Forces in 2013. As a result any failure to establish and 
maintain peace, be it through a negotiated settlement or through armed conflict would essentially be laid 
at the door of the afghan government. Therefore the alternative to a negotiated settlement, which would 
likely include continued violence and instability in Afghanistan may in truth not be a significantly “worse” 
alternative for the international forces. There is however a major factor that affects the international 
perspective, namely the issue of international terrorism. The initial justification for invading Afghanistan 
was based on Taliban support for terrorist outfits like Al-Qaeda and its terror actions around the world. 
Toppling the Taliban and toppling Osama bin Laden was considered to be the only way to secure the world 
against pan-Islamic terrorism. It was assumed that victory over the Taliban would be swift, a new 
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government installed, the people of Afghanistan liberated and the world safe from the scourge of 
terrorists. As history has shown, such was not the case. The elusiveness of the victory and subsequent 
security resulted in the conflict drawing out to well over a decade. If the international forces were to leave 
now, without assuring the security promised at the very outset of the campaign it would mean that 14 
years of resources in terms of personnel, materiel and finances would essentially have been wasted. Not 
only that; if the resurgent Taliban are not engaged in negotiations, it falls on the still weak afghan national 
government to prevent the Taliban from exerting their influence in international terrorism. Given the 
situation as it stands now, it seems unlikely that the government will be able to do so. The other 
alternative to leaving and expecting the afghan government to rein in the Taliban is for the international 
forces to continue their involvement in Afghanistan. This is also not a realistic scenario given the massive 
expense it would represent for all involved parties.  The Taliban strategy is of conducting a “war of the 
flea” (Taber, 1965), aimed at breaking down the fighting capacity and political will of the international 
forces. Any negotiated settlement, as long as it provides security from Taliban supported terrorist activity, 
is therefore preferable to the scenarios presented by not engaging in negotiations. Only a settlement 
which does not involve a cessation of hostilities and security from terrorism falls below the BATNA for 
ISAF members. 
 
For the Afghan National Government much the same logic applies. The Taliban are a force to be reckoned 
with and the current government maintains its hold in no little part due to the backing of international 
forces. If they were to be left with total responsibility for maintaining control without the conflict with the 
Taliban resolved to some degree, the consequences would be highly unsatisfactory. For the Afghan 
Government therefore some level of negotiated settlement that ensures the continuation of the 
government and perhaps the integration of the Taliban in the political sphere therefore provides benefits 
above the BATNA. 
 
In looking at the Taliban it seems that they hold all the cards, and the scenarios excluding a negotiated 
settlement may also be acceptable to them. They may engage the foreign forces in a war of attrition, 
wearing them down and in doing so eroding much of the power that lies behind the Afghan National 
Government. The National Government also seems to pose little threat to them considering the 
resurgence of support for the Taliban and the decreasing approval of the national government by the 
Afghan people (Gallup, 2014). Thus it seems that any negotiations would require provision of sizeable 
benefits to the Taliban in order to be better than the BATNA for the Taliban. Matt Waldman (2010) 
however argues that there are certain compelling reasons for the Taliban to prefer a negotiated 
settlement which non-negotiation cannot provide. Firstly there is the matter of legitimacy. The presence 
of international troops on Afghan soil is a significant factor in the legitimizing the Taliban within 
Afghanistan. They are seen as freedom fighters opposing the violation of afghan sovereignty, a concern 
close to the hearts of the fiercely independent population. The exit of international troops will mean that 
their fight will no longer be against an invading outsider on grounds of sovereignty, but rather an 
ideological internal conflict against other Afghans. In a sense the Taliban popularity paradoxically relies 
on the very elements they are seeking to remove from the country. By engaging with the international 
troops in a negotiation process and coming to an agreement regarding the peace and stability of 
Afghanistan after the exit of international troops, Taliban influence will not suddenly wane after the exit. 
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Rather the continued influence of the Taliban will be legitimized on account of their officially recognized 
role in a post-ISAF Afghanistan. A negotiated settlement also allows the Taliban to gain recognition 
internationally as a political organization, a desire Waldman (2010) argues is important for their further 
functioning in an official capacity in Afghanistan. Any future that does not involve a negotiated settlement 
will fail to give the Taliban the legitimacy they desire both nationally and internationally. Any negotiated 
settlement will give them this recognition. Thus a negotiated settlement will provide benefits beyond their 
BATNA. 
 
4.5.2.1 Conclusion: 
 
For a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan to be considered efficient, it needs to provide security from 
Taliban terrorist activity both locally and internationally while conferring legitimacy in terms of official 
standing to the Taliban. This essentially means that the actual requirements for some sort of negotiated 
settlement is not very high before it becomes preferable to all parties to any scenarios excluding 
negotiations. With the threshold for providing benefits beyond the BATNA for the main involved parties 
comparatively low one may assume that it would be relatively quite possible. 
 
4.5.3 Stability 
 
The level of stability for a negotiated settlement is directly related to the incentives to defect from said 
agreement whether overtly or covertly by agreeing parties and the ability to curb defections through 
enforcement. We will first look at the matter of incentive for the involved parties and address the issue 
of enforcement separately. 
 
Underdal (2002 in Kremenyuk) states that incentives for defection increase when one or more parties to 
an agreement perceive that they have been left worse off by comparison to the other parties by the terms 
of the agreement. This may be if one party realizes that the other was willing to make far greater 
concessions than those secured by the agreement, or that defection carries increased benefits for the 
defector. He also views stability in light of the Prisoners Dilemma which implies that the best case scenario 
for any party to an agreement is if the competing party adheres to the agreement whereas the party itself 
does not. Worst case scenario is when neither party adheres to the agreement. 
 
The absolute minimum for an agreement in this case to be efficient is relatively low for the international 
forces and for the Afghan National Government. Seeing as the basic security required by both these 
parties is extremely unlikely to be obtained without such a negotiated settlement, the incentive to defect 
is extremely low. In any case, once conferred, it will be very difficult to retract official recognition of the 
Taliban. 
 
The threat to stability however is greater from the Taliban side. While legitimacy is an important issue, 
the ideological nature of the Taliban and independent credo makes it unlikely that they will abandon all 
their other demands for this legitimacy. Since their demands are central to their identity there is no sure 
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way of guaranteeing that they will not defect from the agreement. It may at a later stage seem feasible 
to the Taliban to take up arms against the Afghan National Government for any number of reasons. The 
concept of armed struggle in the service of the faith is central to their ideology. Therefore while they may 
be willing to commit to cessation of hostilities under certain conditions, these might be taken up again on 
another pretext. It can therefore not be claimed that the Taliban may not at some point see benefits in 
defecting from the agreement. 
 
Enforcement is only truly an option when there is a significant power differential allowing for one of the 
involved parties or a third party to impose adherence to the signatories of an agreement. Given the fact 
that the Taliban are unlikely to desist from violence indefinitely, one must evaluate if there is any manner 
of enforcement that would oblige adherence to the agreement by the Taliban. This does not seem 
possible. Nearly a decade and a half of attempts to subdue the Taliban by and international coalition 
comprising the most powerful nations on the planet have not succeeded in doing so. There is therefore 
virtually no chance that any attempts at enforcement will succeed. 
 
4.5.3.1 Conclusion: 
 
Though the efficiency of the agreement may imply that neither parties have the incentive to defect, in the 
case of the Taliban this is not sure by any means. Neither is any attempts at enforcement likely to succeed. 
Though the current conditions may give reason to expect stability in the short term, it would be incorrect 
to define any negotiated settlement involving the Taliban as stable beyond a limited time frame. 
 
4.5.4 Distribution 
 
The dimension of distribution is mostly relevant in economic contexts. The simplest way to describe an 
equitable distribution is cost plus benefits divided by share (Underdal 2002 in Kremenyuk). This is clearly 
not easily done in a situation where costs and benefit cannot be ascribed a precise monetary value, nor 
can a “share” be defined. Yet in our analysis we will attempt a basic evaluation of the costs and benefits 
of an eventual negotiated settlement in Afghanistan for the different parties.  
 
For the international forces, a negotiated settlement involves no economic costs. Rather one may argue 
that the international forces have nothing to lose and only something to gain from a negotiated 
settlement. A cessation of hostilities would mean fewer expenses in material and most importantly human 
lives. The minimum benefit would be acquiring the security (to some degree) that lay behind the decision 
to engage in combat in Afghanistan in the first place. In terms of the cost borne by the international forces, 
it will most likely be in terms of concession regarding social aims such as women’s empowerment and 
education. This is unlikely to be considered a major price in light of the fact that most Afghans support 
the patriarchal culture espoused by the Taliban and international forces may well justify the loss of 
women’s rights and the application of sharia law to law and government to be the will of the people. 
There will however also be the matter of foreign military presence in the country. This is a price that may 
very well be demanded by the Taliban for a ceasefire, but given the centrality of the security issue, the 
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international forces (read USA) will likely consider a continued military presence in Afghanistan to be of 
the essence. This may be a price too high to pay for a negotiated settlement. The Afghan National 
Government will likely not consider the cost of peace too high, save if it threatens the government’s writ. 
 
In regards to the Taliban, as an ideologically driven movement it may feel the cost of conceding on issues 
central to their ethos far more distinctly. As we have earlier concluded, the primary benefit the Taliban 
has to gain from a negotiated settlement is legitimacy as a political actor locally and internationally. The 
real question is what it will have to concede in order to get the negotiated settlement and the formal 
recognition as a legitimate political organization. If we take the absolute minimum requirement for a 
negotiated settlement, the main cost the Taliban will have to pay is that of shelving their armed 
opposition. This however has ramifications for their other aims. If they are no longer a security threat, 
their bargaining position on other matters becomes weaker. They will not be in a position to impose the 
strict sharia law that forms the basis of their ideology. They will not be able to realize their pan-Islamism 
mission. They will not be in a position to impose their will on the Afghan National Government. Seeing as 
how armed conflict is a central source of their power, giving it up before they have another equally potent 
source of power would put them in a weak position and curb their ability to pursue their other missions. 
The question then becomes whether the benefit of de jure legitimacy (de facto they are a legitimately 
important actor that cannot be discounted) is worth the price of committing to no longer make use of 
their core strategy, especially when they currently possess no other source of power. 
 
4.5.4.1 Conclusion 
 
It seems that while a negotiated settlement has much to offer all parties in the conflict, the cost of 
achieving the benefits of an eventual negotiated  settlement is comparatively higher for the Taliban in 
terms of both strategy and ideology. This disparity in terms of costs and benefit indicates that a negotiated 
settlement may not be able to find the cost benefit equilibrium whereby all parties gain equally at 
relatively the same cost. 
 
4.5.5 Distance from opening position 
 
Though Underdal (2002 in Kremenyuk) finds the notion suspect, a party’s success in a negotiation is often 
seen in terms of how far they have had to concede from their opening position. It cannot justifiably be 
considered an accurate measure of success since each party has its own strategy of achieving desired 
outcomes and each its own level of flexibility built into the initial demands. 
 
The international forces and the Afghan government have arguably a much greater level of flexibility in 
their position as their objectives at this point in the conflict are more pragmatic than the Taliban. We 
expect that as long as the basic requirement of security will be met in a negotiated settlement, the prime 
objective of the negotiations will have been met for the international forces and the Afghan national 
government. Therefore we expect that this side of the negotiating table will be able to move a greater 
distance from the opening position and still consider the negotiations to be successful.  
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Such, however is not the case with the Taliban. On account of their highly ideological stance and their 
basic stance that they are battling a foreign invasion, it will be difficult for them to concede on too many 
points without perceiving themselves as having been subdued by a foreign power. It therefore becomes 
necessary that they see themselves as having conceded less than the foreign forces and the afghan 
national government in order to be able to term the negotiations a success. 
 
4.5.5.1 Conclusion: 
 
The Taliban have a greater need to be seen as coming out on top in in eventual negotiations. While the 
ISAF and ANG will likely have a greater level of flexibility, and perhaps a more pragmatic approach to what 
can be expected from negotiations, neither side can really afford to be seen as the “loser” in this situation. 
Since any negotiations will be subject to detailed public scrutiny, it is all the more important that the terms 
be seen as equitable by both parties. However we find this to be an unlikely result given the needs of both 
parties. 
 
4.5.6 Section Conclusion: 
 
Our analysis of the consequent cluster of variables indicates that the unlikelihood of a formal agreement 
will mean that a negotiated settlement at first glance cannot be rightly termed as a “complete” 
settlement. The very low threshold for a negotiation to be considered efficient in terms of the parties’ 
BATNA may mean an increased chance for reaching a settlement, however we also conclude that one 
cannot consider an eventual settlement to be stable. There is also the difficulty in sharing costs and 
benefits equally across the parties. Finally we conclude that at the very least the Taliban have a need to 
be seen as “victors” in terms of any settlement, however this is unlikely to be unacceptable to the other 
parties who need as a minimum a “win-win” solution. Thus while we see that any negotiated settlement 
technically ought to be acceptable to both sides, paradoxically the other dimensions of outcomes indicate 
that such a settlement is unlikely. 
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5: Concluding Chapter: 
 
That the Afghan Conflict is exceedingly complex is no surprise to anyone doing even the most cursory 
research of it. It has been our purpose with this project to put some structure to the chaos and determine 
whether there exists a possibility of a negotiated settlement amid the great sea of confusion that this 
conflict represents. 
 
We have seen that perspectives on the need for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban has changed 
over the duration of the conflict. Not until 2009 and the change in the US administration (and very likely 
because of it) did the thought of negotiations with the much reviled Taliban even enter the narrative. The 
belief in a complete and decisive victory was extremely strong at the outset of the conflict spurred on by 
a wave of global condemnation of the 9/11 atrocity. However as the conflict dragged out to become an 
increasingly costly engagement in terms of both men and materiel, the narrative slowly changed to one 
including some form of negotiation with the hereto unsubdued Taliban insurgency. 
 
With pressure mounting from the public discourse politicians and academics alike admitted that a “final 
solution” for Afghanistan would have to be sought also in non-military initiatives. Several abortive 
attempts have been made in recent years to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table by the international 
coalition even though the Karzai government spoke out vehemently against any sort of agreement with 
what they saw to be the greatest threat to security, law and order in Afghanistan. As history has shown, 
none of these attempts have succeeded in bringing any respite to coalition forces and the Afghan National 
Government from the Taliban threat. 
 
Very compelling arguments were put forth by leading academics such Matt Waldman claiming not only 
was the time ripe for a negotiated settlement, but indeed that it was the only way for either side in the 
conflict to arrive at some peaceable conclusion to the conflict. Given the legitimacy of the arguments 
made, it therefore seems strange that not the least headway has been made in even initiating negotiations 
successfully. Till date, the only thing akin to a negotiation that has provided any results, has been the 
negotiated exchange of five Taliban commanders in exchange for US Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdal. Our 
project set out to discover the reasons why attempts at negotiation have been met with such failure. 
 
We reasoned that if the rationale for a negotiated settlement was indeed as solid as Waldman claimed, 
there must be some underlying structural conditions that were preventing the successful initiation of 
negotiations. In order to analyze these conditions we made use of Sawyer and Guetzkow’s Contingency 
Framework. We decided to focus on five primary areas with actors, decision-making and power relations 
falling into the antecedent variables, timing and environment in the concurrent variables and five 
dimensions of outcomes in the consequent variables. 
 
Our analysis has concluded that the arguments in favor of negotiations often present the conflict as 
bilateral and any possible negotiations as bilateral talks, yet the reality of the matter is that the web of 
conflicting interests in the regions require multilateral negotiations as a minimum. It is not sufficient to 
place the Taliban on one side and the coalition forces and afghan national government on the other. All 
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of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors have strong interests in the process as do more distant powers. 
While all are interested in a stable and peaceful Afghanistan, there is far less alignment (and in some cases 
direct opposition) as to how this is to be achieved and at what cost. This level of complexity to some extent 
makes much of the case in favor of negotiations irrelevant. Therefore in terms of the actors involved we 
determine that the complexity is a distinct disadvantage and fundamentally prevents any negotiated 
settlement. 
 
When analyzing the decision-making processes of just the Taliban and coalition forces (realizing fully that 
they do not represent the full spectrum of interested parties in the conflict, yet choosing to focus on these 
two as the two primary actors) we find that both fit into Allison’s Bureaucratic Policy model of decision-
making. From this we conclude that the decision-making process of the main parties is far from conducive 
to a negotiated settlement and thus unlikely to yield successful negotiations. 
 
The analysis on the power relations between the main parties however reveal that the receding power 
differential between the Taliban and coalition forces is actually providing an increased incentive to both 
for conducting successful negotiations. This also ties in very well with the timing of the negotiations, which 
our analysis reveals is likely to be better now than at any time previously in the conflict.  Both these factors 
lie at the foundation for the discourse in favor of negotiations. However the environment of negotiations 
is anything but favorable for negotiations. At present the main parties are communicating at arm’s length 
and any attempt at finding a neutral site (which is better but not ideal for negotiations) have failed.   
 
Finally our analysis of the five dimension of outcomes reveals that any agreement will in the first place be 
a “meeting of minds” at best without any formal or realistically binding treaty resulting. The negotiation 
does not need much in order to be preferable to a scenario in which no negotiations take place, however 
a settlement cannot be expected to be stable in the long term nor is it enforceable. When looking at the 
distribution of costs and benefits of a negotiation it seems that the coalition forces have more to gain and 
at a lower cost than the same benefits for the Taliban. The Taliban also do not have much room to concede 
on their demands without seeming to be on the losing end. Thus in terms of distance from opening 
positions, we find it very difficult to imagine a situation where the two parties can meet. 
 
Our analysis of the conflict and the possibilities of a negotiated settlement therefore ultimately comes to 
the conclusion that even though there are some factors that speak in favor of a negotiated settlement, 
the overall conditions do not exist for such a settlement. 
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